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I. INTRODUCTION
In the world of trademark law, collegiate athletes play without a coach.
Collegiate athletes may compete with third parties, while they are strictly barred
from profiting off their marks. When it comes to trademark application,
registration, and protection, collegiate athletes are aimless individuals who face
difficulty in developing their brands at the most basic level—trademark
protection. Trademark rights serve as a basic protection against the
unauthorized use of one’s marks—a collegiate athlete’s name, nicknames, and
catchphrases. Under the current system, collegiate athletes are forced to travel
highly uncharted territories. This comment serves to shed light on the
approaches of prior collegiate superstars, the current collegiate athletic system,
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relevant trademark law, issues with the current system, and proposed solutions.
II. WHAT COLLEGIATE ATHLETES HAVE DONE
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) governs collegiate
athletics through its Constitution and Bylaws. While several collegiate athletes
have been presented with conflicts between their intellectual property rights
and the NCAA governing legislation, only a few examples are discussed below.
The conflict concerns how a collegiate athlete reconciles his or her limitations
due to the NCAA rules and a desire to protect one’s intellectual property. The
short answer: collegiate athletes do not typically apply for federal trademark
registration. For a multitude of reasons, collegiate athletes forego application.
They might not apply for trademark registration due to a lack of knowledge
about trademark law, fear that filing an application will result in ineligibility or
sanctions against the player or the team, confusion about the NCAA’s stance,
or shortsightedness.1 The first thing on a collegiate athlete’s mind is most likely
not applying for trademark registration. Furthermore, due to the NCAA
Bylaws, a collegiate athlete cannot contract with an agent for help in
understanding the complicated trademark laws without risking ineligibility.2
Furthering a lack of knowledge about law and policy, the NCAA has not
published a statement or policy concerning the possibility of an athlete filing
an intent to use trademark application.3 Additionally, universities and colleges
typically do not persuade their collegiate athletes to properly protect their
intellectual property.4
Collegiate athletes likely do not have the foresight to consider their longterm intellectual property rights. Their primary focus probably lies in
development of their athletic abilities in hopes of entering a professional draft,
without thinking that their nickname or catch phrase deserves proactive
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All
of these factors lead to a big picture issue that many professional athletes have
recently faced: third parties applying for the right to use their intellectual
property.
Some collegiate athletes can become high-profile public figures and
household names. Without proper and timely filings of trademark applications,
they risk the chance that a third party will file an application and begin to use
1. See Darren Heitner, Should Current NCAA Student-Athletes File for Federal Trademark
Protection?, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/12/09/shouldcurrent-ncaa-student-athletes-file-for-federal-trademark-protection/.
2. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art.
12.1.2(g) (2015) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
3. See Heitner, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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their nicknames or catchphrases for profit. These so-called “trademark trolls”
willingly pounce on the opportunity to lay claim to collegiate athletes’ marks,
because collegiate athletes simply do not file applications. The lack of proper
and timely trademark application filing has led professional athletes to resort to
litigation and to fight for the right to use and protect their own intellectual
property. While an athlete who encounters a third party applicant would most
likely succeed in his or her legal battle, the costs of litigation may not only be
expensive, but unnecessary. If collegiate athletes were capable of acquiring
better knowledge about the law and proactively seek to protect their marks, then
legal battles may not have to occur for them to retain their intellectual property
rights from the start.
Vince Young, Anthony Davis, and Johnny Manziel provide textbook
examples of what collegiate athletes have done or not done in the past. Each
of these three men became nationally recognizable names and collegiate
superstars in their respective sport. They each had nicknames or unique
characteristics, which could have provided the opportunity to grow their
individual brands. As we will see, the choices made by these athletes during
and immediately after their collegiate careers had an effect on their future
intellectual property rights.
A. Vince Young
The day after Vince Young led the University of Texas to a college football
national championship in the Rose Bowl in 2006, trademark applications to use
his initials (VY) and his nickname (INVINCEABLE) were filed to sell products
without Young’s permission.5 Moreover, Young was unaware that applications
were even filed to use his initials and nickname in commerce.6 Young was
forced to commence a lawsuit against the third party who filed the applications
to fully receive his intellectual property rights, which, again, were rightfully his
from the beginning. Young did not file any applications to register his marks
while in college, which appears typical for collegiate athletes from the famous
to the run-of-the-mill. Young’s inattentiveness and shortsightedness to the
necessity of applying for trademark protection led him down the path of
litigation. Although he ultimately settled the case and received the rights to his
initials and nickname, Young spent two years of time and attorney fees to
retrieve his trademark rights.7 Perhaps if Young knew more about trademark

5. See Vince Young Files Trademark Suit in Texas for Use of Initials, Nickname, USA TODAY,
Dec. 19, 2008,http://usat oday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/titans/2008-12-19-young-trade
mark-lawsuit_N.htm.
6. See id.
7. See Young v. Vannerson, 612 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
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law or was persuaded to file an application prior to third parties, then he could
have avoided a drawn out legal battle that seemingly persisted past his
professional career.
B. Anthony Davis
Anthony Davis of the National Basketball Association (NBA) became a
freshman phenomenon while playing for the University of Kentucky. He led
the Wildcats to a NCAA National Championship victory in 2012. After his
freshman year, Davis entered the NBA Draft and went on to be the number one
pick. Before his draft day, Davis filed trademark applications for “FEAR THE
BROW,”8 “RAISE THE BROW,”9 “AD23,”10 “BROW DOWN,”11 and
“ANTHONY DAVIS.”12 Davis was fairly proactive in protecting his
intellectual property, but, for two of his marks, he was not the first person or
entity to file an application. “FEAR THE BROW” and “BROW DOWN” both
had trademark applications filed in late 2011.13 The real fear in 2012 was not
of the brow, but of how Davis would acquire full protection of his intellectual
property rights. The options, at the time, were either that Davis file a lawsuit
against the prior applicants or pay the third party for the rights. However, as
time passed, the prior applicants abandoned their marks in November, 201214
and March, 2013,15 respectively. Davis was able to avoid a potentially lengthy,
expensive litigation, or paying out a large sum of money, and now has
successfully registered his marks.16 These prior applications were filed with
the USPTO before Davis had finished his first semester at Kentucky and,
seemingly, as soon as Davis started his first NCAA basketball season. The
situation worked out well for Davis, but imagine if he wished to stay in school
for another three years. Moreover, the prior applicants may have been able to
profit off Davis’s likeness until he left college, which could have led to
extensive litigation. All for the rights to phrases derived from Davis’s physical
feature—his unibrow.

8. FEAR THE BROW, Registration No. 4,660,490.
9. RAISE THE BROW, Registration No. 4,660,491.
10. AD23, Registration No. 4,653,775.
11. BROW DOWN, Registration No. 4,653,774.
12. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/643,436 (filed June 5, 2012).
13. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/477,805 (filed Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter FEAR
THE BROW]; U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/473,719 (filed Nov. 16, 2011) [hereinafter
BROW DOWN].
14. BROW DOWN, supra note 13.
15. FEAR THE BROW, supra note 13.
16. Except for the “ANTHONY DAVIS” mark.
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C. Johnny Manziel
Johnny Manziel, the 2012 Heisman Trophy Winner, has also been proactive
in applying for trademark registration. Manziel entered the NFL in the 2014
draft and was arguably the highest-profile draftee—infamous for his on the
field play and off the field lifestyle. Manziel and his company, JMAN2
Enterprises LLC (JMAN2), have filed sixteen trademark applications. Manziel
and JMAN2 have filed trademark applications for marks such as “Johnny
Football,”17 “The House That Johnny Built,”18 and “Johnny Cleveland.”19
“Johnny Football” has become the focus of two main trademark battles.
First, JMAN2 filed a complaint against Eric Vaughan for using the mark on
a t-shirt.20 Here, Manziel, through his company, effectively protected his mark.
The case eventually settled and Vaughan stopped selling the shirts on his
website.21 Second, Manziel potentially faced litigation against Kenneth R.
Reynolds Family Investments, who applied for the rights to “Johnny Football”
three months before Manziel.22 Litigation was avoided by the USPTO’s
rejection of Reynolds’s application, allowing JMAN2 to move ahead with its
application for the trademark.23 Manziel also faced a competing trademark
application from a company owned by the family of a longtime friend, Nate
Fitch, for the mark “The House That Johnny Built,” who filed an application a
month before Manziel.24 This dispute did not evolve into a lawsuit. Fitch’s
company abandoned the mark in November 2014.25 Manziel’s trademark
history exemplifies what an athlete should do with their marks—apply for
trademark registration and actively protect the use of that mark throughout the
process.26
17. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85/839,336 (filed Feb. 2, 2013).
18. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/178,965 (filed Jan. 29, 2014).
19. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/370,885 (filed Aug. 19, 2014).
20. See Michelle Keahey, “Johnny Football” Files Trademark Infringement Lawsuit over
Shirts, SE. TEXAS REC. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://setexasrecord.com/news/282039-johnny-football-filestrademark-infringement-lawsuit-over-shirts.
21. See Jeff Mosier, Johnny Manziel’s Family Settle T-shirt Lawsuit, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2013, http://thescoopblog.dallasnews.com/2013/11/johnny-manziels-family-settle-t-shirtlawsuit.html/.
22. See Chase Goodbread, Johnny Manziel Wins ‘Johnny Football’ Trademark Case, NFL
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000335932/article/johnny-manziel-winsjohnny-football-trademark-case.
23. See id.
24. See Chase Goodbread, Johnny Manziel, Longtime Friend Set to Battle for Trademark
Rights, NFL (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000339271/article/johnnymanziel-longtime-friend-set-to-battle-for-trademark-rights.
25. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/153,461 (filed Dec. 27, 2013) (abandoned on
Nov. 13, 2014).
26. In addition, a couple more recent applications have been filed by current collegiate athletes.

CLEMENTE.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

162

3/10/2017 2:32 PM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 20:1

D. What To Take Away
The three prior examples show two approaches former collegiate athletes
have taken to protect their marks. On the one hand, Vince Young neglected to
timely file trademark applications for his initials and nickname. He then had to
resort to the court system to retrieve the rights to his marks, which took years.27
Meanwhile, Young saw his once promising professional career dwindle to a
life of backup positions, practice squads, and free agency. By the time Young
won his trademark battle, he no longer played for a NFL team. On the other
hand, Anthony Davis and Johnny Manziel proactively applied for trademark
protection prior to being drafted. They also actively protected their marks by
seeking out those who either wrongfully applied before them or were using
their mark in commerce without their consent. Preferably, more collegiate
athletes will follow the Davis/Manziel approach and not Young’s mistakes.
III. THE CURRENT NCAA SYSTEM
A. NCAA Rules
The NCAA Constitution and Bylaws govern collegiate athletes and
determine eligibility for competition.28 Eligibility allows a collegiate athlete to
participate in inter-collegiate sports.29 The bylaws regulate the minimum
grades a collegiate athlete must achieve, the acceptance of payment, use of
agents, promotional activities, ethical conduct, recruitment, financial aid, and
many other facets.30 All of those may have an effect on a player’s eligibility to
compete inter-collegiately.31
Amateurism is a foundational principle of the NCAA and collegiate
athletics.32 Eligibility requirements are tailored to “assure proper emphasis on
educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among institutions and
to prevent exploitation of student-athletes.”33 If a collegiate athlete loses
amateur status, he or she becomes ineligible to compete in that particular
Ezekiel Elliott has filed applications with the USPTO for marks, e.g. “HERO IN A HALF SHIRT,”
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/732,902 (filed Aug. 21, 2015). See also U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 86/732,892 (filed Aug. 21, 2015), U.S. Trademark Application Serial No.
86/717,843 (filed Aug. 7, 2015), and U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86/717,832 (filed Aug.
7, 2015). Dak Prescott has filed applications for his marks as well, e.g. “WHO DAK,” U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 86/546,163 (filed Feb. 25, 2015).
27. See Young v. Vannerson, 612 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
28. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2.
29. See id. art. 12.01.
30. See id. art. 12.
31. See id.
32. See Amateurism, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).
33. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 2.12.
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sport.34 An individual loses amateur status if he or she (1) uses his or her
athletic skill for pay in any form in that sport; (2) accepts a promise of pay,
even if that pay is to be received after completion of collegiate competition; (3)
signs a contract or commitment to play professional athletics; (4) receives any
financial assistance from a professional sports organization; (5) competes on
any professional athletic team, even if he or she receives no pay; (6) enters into
a professional draft; or (7) enters into an agreement with an agent.35 Pay is
defined as “the receipt of funds, awards or benefits not permitted” by the
NCAA’s governing legislation.36 An agent is defined as anyone who either (1)
“[r]epresents or attempts to represent an individual for the purpose of marketing
his or her athletic ability or reputation for financial gain” or (2) “[s]eeks to
obtain any type of financial gain or benefit from securing a prospective studentathlete’s enrollment at an educational institution or from a student-athlete’s
potential earnings as a professional athlete.”37 An agent may include a financial
advisor, marketing representative, or brand manager.38
When analyzing United States trademark law and the NCAA Constitution
and Bylaws, it may seem that collegiate athletes are barred from acquiring
trademark protection for their name, likeness, slogans, etc. Under NCAA
Bylaw 12.5.2.1, a collegiate athlete loses eligibility for participation in intercollegiate athletics if he or she “[a]ccepts any remuneration for or permits the
use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly
the sale or use of a commercial product or service.”39 Additionally, NCAA
Bylaw 12.4.4 states that a collegiate athlete cannot use his or her name,
photograph, appearance, or athletic reputation to promote his or her own
business.40 Therefore, a collegiate athlete cannot use his or her personal brand
to profit, contract with an agent to facilitate such use, use his or her name or
likeness to promote another commercial business or product, or allow the use
of his or her brand with a promise of future pay.41 While all these limitations
exist in the current NCAA system, collegiate athletes could conceivably acquire
federal trademark registration.42

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. art. 12.1.2.
See id. art. 12.1.2 (a)–(g).
See id. art. 12.02.8.
See id. art. 12.02.1.
See id. art. 12.02.1.1.
See id. art. 12.5.2.1.
See id. art. 12.4.4.
See id. art. 12.
See infra Part IV.A.
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B. NCAA Rules and Trademark Law
For our purposes, trademarks can be applied for through two primary
routes: § 1(a)43 and § 1(b)44 bases. An application for a trademark on a § 1(a)
basis (use in commerce basis) involves a mark that is currently used in
commerce.45 An application on a § 1(b) basis (intent to use basis) involves a
bona fide intent to use a mark in commerce.46 This comment will emphasize
the possibility of a collegiate athlete to file on both bases. NCAA rules greatly
restrict the ability to file on a use in commerce basis. According to the NCAA
Bylaws, a collegiate athlete loses eligibility if he or she receives remuneration
for or permits the use of his or her name or likeness in commerce.47 NCAA
rules also impact the effectiveness of the intent to use basis. A collegiate athlete
who files on an intent to use basis does not explicitly violate any NCAA Bylaw
and would not lose eligibility.48 A collegiate athlete could apply on an intent
to use basis and, once his or her college career has ended, begin using the mark
in the commerce. Once their collegiate career ends, collegiate athletes are out
of the NCAA’s jurisdiction and can begin to profit off their names or likenesses.
Outside of federal registration, trademark law already confers some
protections for collegiate athletes. “The unauthorized misappropriation of an
athlete’s persona violates . . . the Lanham Act if it causes consumer confusion
regarding whether he or she has endorsed or sponsored particular products or
services.”49 The First Amendment, however, limits the protections conferred
by the Act.50 The protections, though, apply to unregistered marks: unfair
practices provisions protect unregistered marks.51 Therefore, even though a
collegiate athlete’s mark may be unregistered, the Act provides for civil
remedies against unauthorized use.52

43. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2012).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2012).
45. See § 1051(a).
46. See § 1051(b).
47. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, arts. 12.1.2, 12.5.
48. See Christie Cho, Protecting Johnny Football[R]: Trademark Registration for Collegiate
Athletes, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 66 (2015).
49. MATTHEW J. MITTEN, SPORTS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (Roger Blanpain et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2014); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
50. See Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); MITTEN, supra note 49; see Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 1114, 1136 (D. N.J. 1993); see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767 (1992).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); MITTEN, supra note 49.
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IV. ISSUES THAT ARISE FOR A COLLEGIATE ATHLETE IN TRADEMARK LAW
Issues for collegiate athletes in the trademark world arise in both the use in
commerce and intent to use bases. The NCAA’s restriction on the acceptance
or promise of payment strengthens barriers to trademark registration. The
issues that arise under both bases are discussed below. Use in commerce basis
issues arise on a prima facie level, namely the lack of any potential monetary
gain; thus, the issues for this basis are not discussed in vast detail. Attention is
given to the inability of a collegiate athlete to receive payment.53 Intent to use
basis issues receive more attention below due to the suggestion that collegiate
athletes should focus their trademark application efforts under this basis.54
Those issues include the limitations of applying on an intent to use basis and
lack of objective intent.
A. Use in Commerce Basis
Filing on a use in commerce basis requires that the mark be presently in use
in commerce.55 The Lanham Act defines “commerce” as “all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress,”56 a sweeping definition. The Act
defines “use in commerce” as
the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark
shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers
or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels
affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with
the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising
of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the
services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States
and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is
53.
54.
55.
56.

Other issues that may arise are not discussed in this comment.
See generally Cho, supra note 48.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
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engaged in commerce in connection with the services.57
The combination of the requirements of a use in commerce basis and
NCAA rules may lead one to conclusively believe that the rules bar a collegiate
athlete from effectively applying on a use in commerce basis. While the
NCAA’s rules limit a collegiate athlete’s ability to register a mark under this
basis, the rules may not completely bar such registration. Later in this
comment, we will explore a promising route that could lead to more federal
trademark registrations on a use in commerce basis.58
Limitations applied by the NCAA rules include the restriction on accepting
any form of payment59 or any promise of payment.60 At first glance, it appears
that collegiate athletes would not be able to satisfy the “use in commerce”
requirement. Indeed, the proscription of payment of any kind, at any time,
offers a large barrier to using a mark in commerce. Additionally true,
commerce typically involves the exchange or buying and selling of a good or
service on a large scale.61 The restrictions imposed by the NCAA rules
effectively bar a collegiate athlete from registering on a use in commerce basis
for his or her own use in commerce, as commerce typically connotes the selling
of goods or services for some gain.
B. Intent to Use Basis
1. Limitations of Applying on an Intent to Use Basis
Intent to use requires both actual intent to use and objective evidence that
such an intent exists.62 An applicant usually can prove bona fide intent to use
through “a written plan of action.”63 An applicant’s state of mind cannot
demonstrate the requisite intent to use.64 The policy considerations behind
these requirements are strong. Congress surely did not intend nor want the
intent to use application system to allow for applicants to merely place a claim
over a mark which they did not actually intend to use in commerce.65
57. Id.
58. See infra Part IV.A.
59. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 12.1.2.1.
60. See id. art. 12.1.2(b).
61. See Commerce, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/commerce (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
62. See Aktieselskabet AF 21 November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
63. W. Brand Bobosky v. Adidas AG, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (D. Or. 2011) (quoting 4 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:14 (4th ed.
2011)).
64. See id.
65. See S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5582.
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On opposition, a collegiate athlete looking to maintain an intent to use
application must objectively show his or her intent to actually use the mark in
commerce. The issue under this objectivity standard is that collegiate athletes
perhaps cannot conceive of a “written plan of action” to use their mark in
commerce. Additionally, composing a written plan, while not explicitly
violating NCAA rules, could lead the collegiate athlete into eligibility trouble
if additional steps are taken.66
“Intent to use a mark, like a naked registration, establishes no rights at all.”67
While intent to use applicants may seem to have rights to their marks, in reality,
they do not. Intent to use applications do have benefits, but the mere fact that
someone, even with a bona fide intent to use, desires to use a mark and has a
plan to do so, does not create a legally protectable right.68 Upon registration,
only a rebuttable presumption of use exists from the date of filing.69
What does this mean for collegiate athletes? Simply put, even though
collegiate athletes can technically apply for registration under intent to use,70
their rights to protect their marks only come to fruition once the good is actually
used in commerce. And, then, they only have a rebuttable presumption that
their marks are in use as of the filing date. Thus, a third party, who uses the
mark in commerce prior to the collegiate athlete filing under intent to use, could
be safe from legal action for that prior use. Only when the collegiate athlete
uses the mark in commerce does constructive use apply retroactively to the date
of filing.71 However, under current NCAA rules, actual use in commerce is
restricted and may cause delay of use until after graduation or cessation of
intercollegiate athletic participation.
2. Lack of Objective Intent
In Aktieselskabet AF 21 November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc.,72 the D.C.
Circuit held that that Bestseller sufficiently stated a claim that Fame lacked a
bona fide intent to use the mark “Jack & Jones.”73 In doing so, the court noted
that an “opposer may defeat a trademark application for lack of a bona fide
intent . . . by proving the circumstances at the time of filing did not demonstrate
that intent.”74 In this case, Fame filed an intent to use application for the mark
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 12.5.
Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1992).
See id.
See id.
See Cho, supra note 48.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012).
See Aktieselskabet AF 21 November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
See id. at 23.
See id. at 21.
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allegedly to thwart Bestseller’s entrance into the U.S. market.75 The court
found that Bestseller’s allegations sufficiently showed circumstances that
refuted Fame’s good faith intent to use the mark in commerce.76 The court
here also concluded that, under § 2(d), “an intent to use applicant prevails over
any opposer who began using a similar mark after the intent to use filing date.”77
Furthermore, to succeed in a § 2(d) claim, the opposer must show there is a
likelihood of confusion with a mark “previously used”—for intent to use
applicants the only date applicable is the filing date.78
Applying the D.C. Circuit’s opinion to collegiate athletes, the problem that
collegiate athletes face has two main parts. First, if a third party already has an
intent to use application pending with the USPTO, then the athlete must be able
to show that he or she used the mark prior to the third party’s filing date. When
it comes to collegiate athletes, this proves nearly impossible, because, due to
NCAA rules, they are restricted in using their mark in commerce—this could
lead to profiting off their name or likeness, which is a clear violation of NCAA
rules.79 Second, if the collegiate athlete filed an intent to use application prior
to an opposing third party, then that third party could allege that the collegiate
athlete lacked a bona fide intent by showing that the circumstances at the time
of filing did not demonstrate that intent. The third party could show that, due
to the NCAA rules, the athlete could not have had a bona fide intent to use the
mark, because the athlete was barred from such use.80 Additionally, a third
party could allege that the athlete’s intent to use application was merely
intended to either thwart a third-party user, or put a placeholder on the mark
until that athlete ceased intercollegiate athletics. These allegations would not
be unfounded. Under the current system, an athlete filing on an intent to use
basis would be doing so to prevent others from using the mark and/or putting a
placeholder on that mark.
3. Creating A Plan of Action
In Young v. Vannerson,81 Vince Young alleged infringement on his
common law trademark in VY and INVINCEABLE.82 The defendant had filed
intent to use applications with the USPTO for those marks, of which Young
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See id. at 22.
See id.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 12.5.
See id. art. 12.5.
See Young v. Vannerson, 612 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
See id. at 833.
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claimed he was a senior user.83 The District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division agreed with the defendant on the point that a mere
trademark application does not confer rights to a party, but also stated that
plaintiffs alleging infringement did not have to wait until registration is granted
to file suit.84 The court further acknowledged that a controversy does not arise
when a defendant has not used the mark with any product or “taken any steps
to sell, transport, distribute, market, or advertise . . . any products or samples of
products.”85 The court found that there was a sufficient controversy and denied
Vannerson’s motions to dismiss, because Vannerson had taken steps to design,
manufacture, license, and sell products with the marks.86
Creating a business plan or a plan of action to use their mark could
theoretically expose collegiate athletes to litigation if there are other users of
the mark.87 The cost of fighting to defend their trademark rights in court could
be expensive, which could lead to many athletes with claims to marks to simply
give up. There would potentially be little incentive for collegiate athletes to
press on and fight an expensive battle in court when they are fighting for the
rights to a mark from which they cannot presently profit. Additionally, the
court system can be slow-going, so they could have a litigation lingering over
their heads, possibly past the cessation of their inter-collegiate activities.
The overarching issue is that, in order to claim rights under an intent to use
application, the athlete needs to develop an objective plan of action, but, by
doing so, he or she opens himself or herself up to potential litigation from third
parties who may be wrongfully using the marks. Now, the athlete could
probably prevail in such a situation, but, with the high cost of litigation and
little incentive to push forward through years of litigation for a theoretical
future benefit, the third party (potential infringer) could prevail almost by
default.
The current NCAA system leaves athletes on their own to protect their
marks. Even when an athlete is foresighted enough to file an intent to use
application, they can be exposed to litigation battles that they likely can neither
afford nor want to pursue. And, if litigation does not occur initially, once the
athlete leaves the NCAA’s control and pursues development of his or her brand,
then litigation from third party users (who potentially have been using the mark
in commence for years) can bring suit against the athlete. The system is flawed
and could use some fine tuning to focus on the well-being of the athletes—a
83. See id.
84. See id. at 845.
85. See id. at 843 (citing United Am. Indus., Inc. v. Cumberland, No. CV-06-1833-PHX-FJM,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894, 2007 WL 38279 at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2007)).
86. See id. at 847.
87. The roles in Young are reversed for this hypothetical scenario, but the main idea persists.
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system where the NCAA actively aids its athletes throughout this process
instead of ignoring their rights to their own marks.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Use in Commerce Basis
88

As alluded to above, the primary issue arising under the use in commerce
basis involves the inability for collegiate athletes to receive payment or a
promise of payment while maintaining eligibility. Collegiate athletes would
then not be able to satisfy the use in commerce requirement as they could not
introduce their mark into commerce independently. Although the payment
problem deserves its own discussion, our focus will be on how a collegiate
athlete could have their mark in use in commerce while remaining eligible by
not violating any NCAA rules. Furthermore, the NCAA has yet to state its
stance on collegiate athletes applying for federal trademark registration. A
proposed solution, which would allow application on a use in commerce basis,
involves a nonprofit organization, a collegiate athlete, and a licensing
agreement.
A nonprofit organization can surely benefit from the advantages of federal
trademark registration. Nonprofits can apply for and have received registration
for their marks.89 Nonprofit activity falls into the Lanham Act’s definitions of
commerce, because Congress has already proven its jurisdiction over
nonprofits by claiming prerogative to grant the benefit of nonprofit status over
the organizations.90 Nonprofits that use trademarks in connection with a good
or service may acquire ownership rights with evidence of competition.91
The next actor in this scenario is the collegiate athlete looking to satisfy the
use in commerce requirement. Considerations to keep in mind while discussing
a collegiate athlete’s role in this route to registration primarily include the
proscription on receipt of payment or promises of payment in the future.
Therefore, the end result of this scenario will not involve any present monetary
gain or a promise for pay.

88. See supra Part III.A.
89. See, e.g., PEER CONNECTIONS, Registration No. 4,804,033; BRIDGING THE GAP,
Registration No. 4,587,793; THIS IS SCOUTING, Registration No. 4,742,246; and BE PREPARED,
Registration No. 4,811,796.
90. See IRC § 501 (2012), as amended by P. L 114-113; see Karl Emerson, Who Should
Regulate Nonprofits?, ASS’N OF FUNDRAISING PROFS., http://www.afpnet.org/Publications/Article
Detail.cfm?ItemNumber=852. (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
91. See generally Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir.
2001) (the court was speaking about eleemosynary individuals, but the same idea can be applied
towards eleemosynary organizations).
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The final actor is the hypothetical licensing agreement between the
nonprofit and the collegiate athlete. Under this proposal, the collegiate athlete
would license his or her marks to a nonprofit as an act of charity, expecting nor
accepting any remuneration in exchange for the right to use the mark. The
nonprofit could then use these marks in their fundraising efforts. Since
nonprofits can register their marks with the USPTO, then, conceivably, their
use of a collegiate athlete’s mark could constitute use to satisfy the use in
commerce requirement. “Years of precedent make it very clear that proper use
of a mark by a trademark owner’s licensee or related company constitutes ‘use’
of that mark attributable to the trademark owner.”92 This attribution of the
nonprofit’s (licensee) use in commerce is akin to the use in commerce of a
related company. For this to work, the collegiate athlete would need to file a
trademark application and license the mark to the nonprofit, as the “related
companies” doctrine only applies to registered marks or applied for marks.93 A
collegiate athlete would also be required to maintain sufficient control over the
nonprofit’s use of his or her mark.
For this scenario to work, the nonprofit must fall within the Lanham Act’s
definition of a related company. A “related company” is “any person whose
use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature
and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is
used.”94 The collegiate athlete needs to exercise control over the nonprofit’s
use of the mark, but not over the nonprofit’s broader actions.95 Whether the
collegiate athlete exhibits enough control is decided on a factual basis by
tribunals.96 Circuit courts evaluating the sufficiency of control have differed
on the requisite amount of control necessary.97 The concern within this
proposal revolves around whether the license arrangement could be considered
a naked licensing, which may lead to abandonment.98 With the proper exercise
of control over the nonprofit, a collegiate athlete then would succeed in
receiving registration of his or her mark.

92. Quality Candy Shoppes/Buddy Squirrel of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Grande Foods, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1393 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
93. See 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.04(2)(b)(i) (2015).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
95. 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 93, at §6.04(2)(b)(iii); Estate of Coll-Monge v.
Inner Peace Movement, 524 F.3d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
96. 2 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 93, at §6.04(4).
97. Id. §6.04(4)(b).
98. See 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 3.05(9) (2015).
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B. Intent to Use Basis
Under this proposal, the collegiate athlete applies on an intent to use basis
for his or her marks. The NCAA has already shown that it will not stand in the
way of an athlete seeking to protect his or her brand—allowing unpaid
collegiate athletes to prevent others from using their marks.99 However, the
NCAA does not have a clearly articulated stance on collegiate athletes applying
for trademark registration on an intent to use basis. The collegiate athlete runs
the risk that his or her actions will cross some imaginary line, set up by the
NCAA, resulting in ineligibility. So, the NCAA’s acquiescence with collegiate
athletes fighting to protect the use of their marks does not line up well with their
strong stance against an athlete profiting.
In her article, Christie Cho points out many excellent reasons as to why the
intent to use application works within the current NCAA system.100 Cho
concludes that the Manziel “loophole” suggests a new solution to the issue of
protecting collegiate athletes’ rights that is compatible with amateurism. 101
Furthermore, Cho acknowledges that trademark rights will become ever more
important and vital if the NCAA were to adopt a pay-for-play or the Olympic
Model.102 Cho’s conclusion that continuing to utilize the intent to use basis
recognizes collegiate athletes’ intellectual property rights as students and future
professional athletes.103 However, the ability to apply should not be so limited,
as seen in the issues presented infra in Part III.B.
Cho’s article illustrates and exposes one possible method to working
trademark law into the current NCAA system. However, the ultimate issues
still arise by following the status quo. The assumption that collegiate athletes
can wait until they enter professional athletics to profit off their marks definitely
works for the high-profile, Manziel-type athletes (given that they are as
proactive about seeking trademark protection as Manziel), but the number of
collegiate athletes entering professional sports is very low.104 Under the current
NCAA system, this solution works well. Alternatively, the NCAA system could
adjust itself for the benefit of collegiate athletes.

99. As evidenced in the NCAA’s stance with Johnny Manziel. See generally Clay Travis,
Johnny Manziel Opens Massive Loophole in Paying Players Rule, FOX SPORTS (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/outkick-the-coverage/johnny-manziel-opens-massiveloophole-in-paying-players-rule-022513.
100. See Cho, supra note 48.
101. See id. at 84.
102. See id. at 83.
103. See id. at 85.
104. See Probability of Competing In Sports Beyond High School, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.
org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
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C. Olympic Model
In his comment, Arash Afshar argues that the Olympic Model serves as a
sufficient solution to affording collegiate athletes their rights of publicity within
the amateurism system.105 Afshar draws comparisons between the historic
Olympic amateurism model and that of the present NCAA.106 The premise of
which contemplates that the NCAA should be able to do the same, with similar
results, because the Olympics survived affording competitors their intellectual
property rights.107 Furthermore, Afshar concludes that the Olympic Model can
coexist with NCAA amateurism.108
The comparisons between the Olympics and the NCAA are stark and
enlightening. Both systems strive for a system based on amateurism. One, the
Olympics, allows competitors to obtain endorsements (and get paid for them),
while, on the other hand, the NCAA would see this as a violation of its
bylaws.109 The Olympic Model serves as a good solution to the restrictions
placed on a collegiate athlete in exercising his or her intellectual property rights.
Under such a change, collegiate athletes would be able to use their marks in
commerce and have the money to defend their marks against unauthorized
users. More than likely, endorsement deals and licensing would be the primary
route that collegiate athletes would benefit from being allowed to fully utilize
their marks.
One could imagine the scenario where, after national signing day,
graduating high school seniors become bombarded with offers from potential
agents and companies seeking their endorsement. As such, the NCAA would
likely want to offer protection to collegiate athletes from this bombardment.
Additionally, one could imagine that agents going after eighteen year olds, who
have not established themselves as collegiate athletes yet, could conceivably
seek to benefit from these young men and women (perhaps by taking large cuts
from any potential profits). The NCAA reasonably should desire to protect
collegiate athletes from such a situation. Another possible solution would be
for the NCAA to take a proactive role in aiding collegiate athletes through the
processes of application, licensing, and protecting their marks.

105. See Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict Between NCAA Amateurism and a
Student Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101 (2014).
106. See id. at 111.
107. See id. at 112 (The argument that the rule changes would destroy the Olympic games was
proved wrong by its increased popularity).
108. See id. at 133.
109. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, art. 12.5.
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D. An NCAA-Created Body
If the NCAA wishes to maintain the principle of amateurism in college
sports, which it reasonably may, then one ideal solution involves a hands-on
approach by the NCAA. Under this proposal, the NCAA could set up a body
that would serve to promote, encourage, and aid collegiate athletes in applying
for and defending their marks—and, ideally, the broader right to publicity.
Although some view the ultimate goal as allowing collegiate athletes a claim to
their publicity rights, the focus in the present should rest on trademark
protection.110 First, trademark law is fairly settled, which would allow for an
immediate impact on players’ rights, while publicity rights are less definite.111
Second, providing for and encouraging the protection of collegiate athletes’
marks is an excellent starting point to build upon. This proposal within the
NCAA involves an agent-like body and needs a system of distributing the
generated income.
The NCAA would become more of a partner—working with collegiate
athletes to increase their brand’s worth, primarily through trademark law. In
this proposed system, the NCAA’s newly created body could serve as the
athletes’ legal representative and agent working to file trademark applications
and develop a plan of action to use the marks in commerce. This body would
work with the athletes to promote their marks, find third party licensees, and
defend against unauthorized use. Remember that these collegiate athletes are
young men and women who presumably do not understand their intellectual
property rights—they need the representation. The NCAA, considering its
present state, serves as the best entity to aid collegiate athletes in this manner.
Now, with the promotion and use of marks in commerce, comes another
issue—what to do with the money that is generated. We could envision why
the NCAA would prefer the money not go straight to the collegiate athlete. This
hesitation could exist for many possible reasons: avoiding income disparity
between superstars and their teammates; keeping the ideals of student-first,
athlete-second; or providing for fair and collegial competition. In this regard,
the NCAA could set up trust funds for the collegiate athletes utilizing its
intellectual property services. The NCAA could structure these trusts to
distribute income as it sees fit—to cover educational expenses, room and board,
travel home, etc.—while withdrawing administrative and legal fees. Although
tax issues may arise, the consequences of those are beyond the scope of this
comment.

110.
111.

See generally Cho, supra note 48.
See id. at 84.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This comment serves to shed light on a very basic issue within the NCAA
system—tough restrictions on the ability for collegiate athletes to promote and
better protect their marks. Proposals for applying under the use in commerce
and intent to use bases reflect the persistent amateurism culture in the NCAA.
These proposals look at methods, which are consistent with the current NCAA
system, to promote trademark registration by collegiate athletes. Proposals for
an Olympic Model or an NCAA-created body would be undertaken only after
considerable thought on the part of the NCAA as changes that would allow
collegiate athletes broader intellectual property rights would undeniably affect
its current amateurism stance. Operating under the current, outdated system,
however, harms collegiate athletes. Change could occur within the NCAA’s
system to benefit collegiate athletes, while preserving the general ideals of
amateurism. The Olympic Model could serve this purpose well, but
reservations about exposing young men and women to the open market could
prevent the NCAA from adopting such a model. The NCAA creating a body
to serve as collegiate athletes’ legal representatives and agents could be an
effective solution. It would cover any reservations the NCAA may have about
the Olympic Model.
As for the present, collegiate athletes should start furthering protection of
their marks through federal trademark registration. They could conceivably
apply and register their trademarks on a use in commerce basis by following a
proposal as described in this comment. Alternatively, they could apply on an
intent to use basis, as already performed by recent collegiate athletes. Under
this approach, collegiate athletes can take steps to further protect their
trademark rights, but remember that this proposal comes with potential
problems. Today, collegiate athletes should start applying for federal
trademark registration to advance their intellectual property rights.
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